This paper considers the structure, governance and performance of a unique class of mutual funds that receives capital only from individuals, and reinvests this contributed capital in private companies, as opposed to traditional mutual funds that invest in publicly traded companies. We consider the particular class of mutual funds known as Canadian Labour-Sponsored Investment Funds (LSIFs). We point out that similar funds have been introduced in the UK; as well, it has been argued that the Canadian LSIF structure should be introduced in the US. In contrast to expectations, we show that LSIFs have artificially low betas (the average beta is 0.38), returns that have significantly underperformed industry benchmarks (including risk-free 30-day T-bills), average MERs greater than 4%, and have collectively accumulated $CAN 8 billion ($US 5 billion) over 1992-2002. We show that these incongruous data are directly attributable to the LSIF statutory structure. LSIF legislation mandates episodic valuations that determine share prices, an 8-year investor lock-in period, and onerous constraints on capital reinvestment. LSIFs also afford to their investors tax-generated returns in excess of 100%. The unique LSIF structure provides generalizable insights into the relation between organizational governance and performance, and the unsuitability of mutual fund structures for private equity investment.
Introduction
Mutual funds traditionally aggregate the capital contributions of individual investors and reinvest their contributed capital mainly in publicly traded companies (see, e.g., Massa, 2003; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2002; Wermers, 2000 , Chen et al., 2000 , Khorana, 2001 , Carhart, 1997 Droms and Walker, 1996; Buttimer et al., 2001) . Venture capital funds aggregate the contributions of institutional investors (primarily pension funds), corporations, and wealthy individuals and invest these contributions in the equity of private and potentially high growth technology firms (Sahlman, 1990; Berger and Udell, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 1999a; Schwienbacher, 2001; Neus and Walz, 2003; Hege et al., 2003) . In some countries, including Canada and the U.K., a new type of tax-advantaged mutual fund has emerged that is essentially a hybrid between a traditional mutual fund and a traditional venture capital fund. This fund structure has been attracting increasing attention; for example, it has been argued that the Canadian model should be adopted in the US (see, e.g., Hebb, 1999) . These funds collect the capital contributions of individual investors, regardless of their net worth (as does a mutual fund), but invest in private equity (as does a venture capital fund). The balance of portfolio firms ranges from investments in mostly traditional sectors to mostly or entirely high tech. This paper examines one such fund: the Canadian Labour Sponsored Investment Fund (LSIF). This paper relates the governance structure of this hybrid mutual fund / venture capital fund to its performance. 1 At the highest level of generality, this paper engages two important issues. First, what is the linkage between organizational structure and fund risk and return? Second, is this type of tax-advantaged vehicle a target-efficient means of re-directing investment dollars into private entrepreneurial companies? In respect of the first of these questions, we suggest that the unique organizational structure of the LSIF funds is a primary reason for their extremely poor performance. In respect of the second, we suggest that the statutory design of the LSIF fund programs is such as to frustrate, rather than contribute to achievement of their primary objective. 1 In related work, Martin and Petty (1983) analyze the performance of publicly traded venture capital companies. Kleim (1998) considers the case of mutual funds that invest in small-cap stocks; see also Nanda and Singh (1998) . Previous research on LSIFs has considered a fairly narrow range of issues, including governmental tax expenditures of LSIFs, the performance of LSIF entrepreneurial firms, and the impact of LSIFs on the market for private equity. In particular, Osbourne and Sandler (1998) compute the direct costs of LSIFs to the Canadian taxpayers (see also Vaillancourt, 1997) , Halpern (1997) , Brander et al. (2002) show that LSIF entrepreneurial firm investments underperform entrepreneurial investments from other Canadian private equity investments (see Anderson and Tian, 2003 , for a Monte Carlo experiment) and Cumming and MacIntosh (2002) LSIF data present a puzzling picture. Since LSIFs invest in comparatively risky small (and private) entrepreneurial firms, we would naturally expect to observe average betas in excess of one, in addition to risk-adjusted returns in excess of standard market benchmarks (Smith and Smith, 2000; Cochrane, 2001; Kerins et al., 2003; Astebro, 2003) . Surprisingly, the data indicate the exact opposite: almost all LSIFs have betas less than 1 (with an average 3-year beta of 0.378), and LSIF returns are consistently lower than all industry-wide benchmarks over a 10-year horizon, including 30-day risk-free tbills. Despite gross underperformance, LSIF MERs are as high as 8%, and the average MER is 4.03%
(nearly twice as high as the average Canadian mutual fund MER). Equally astonishing, given their poor performance and high MERs, is that over a 10-year period LSIF assets under administration have grown from less than $1 billion to more than $8 billion.
The analysis of LSIF betas, returns and asset accumulation presents some rather unique challenges. LSIF share prices are not determined in the market, but by periodic evaluations of net asset values per share as determined by the board of directors (for interim reporting periods) and by an independent valuer (for year-end reporting), with some variation in the frequency of these valuations.
Therefore, LSIF returns are not driven by CAPM-type assumptions and/or the Fama and French (1993, 1995) factors, etc. For this reason, we refer to LSIF betas as "pseudo-betas". These pseudo-betas are not an accurate measure of systematic risk, but at best constitute a measure of the relative risk across the different LSIFs. As well, because share prices are determined by periodic valuations, they are not amenable to time-series analysis. We thus analyze LSIF returns using a cross-sectional analysis over 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year horizons. In the cross-sectional analysis, we show LSIF pseudo-betas are inversely related to returns (in contrast to the standard positively sloped security market line), over measurement horizons up (and including) to 5-years.
We suggest that the extremely low LSIF returns are a product of statutory constraints that inefficiently constrain managerial choice and investment choice. In particular (depending on the province of incorporation), LSIFs must reinvest up to 80% of their contributed capital within a 1 to 3-year period of the contribution date, and pay severe penalties for non-compliance. This constraint can adversely affect returns in two ways -first, by forcing managers to commit capital to inferior investment projects; and second, by attenuating the due diligence process that lies at the heart of equity investing (Gompers and Lerner, 1999a) and adversely impacting the quality of the deal forged with various of a LSIF's portfolio companies. Further statutory constraints exacerbate this problem by limiting the allowable types of investments in entrepreneurial firms, imposing constraints on the structuring of investments and the size of an investment in any given firm, and limiting the geographical situs of investee firms. In addition, in contrast to their private venture fund counterparts, LSIF funds must be structured as corporations, sacrificing the various advantages associated with limited partnership form.
We show that, like private venture capital funds (Gompers and Lerner, 1999b) , LSIF management remuneration consists of a combination of fixed fees (ostensibly to cover out-of-pocket costs) and carried interest (i.e., a percentage of the appreciation in the value of the fund's investment portfolio, typically paid after certain performance hurdles are met). Unlike either mutual funds or venture capital funds, however, LSIF funds typically split the functions performed by the manager between the "investment manager" and the "advisor". The former either invests the funds' assets, or advises the fund's board of directors on the investment of assets, and the latter performs a variety of other administrative and marketing functions. Both LSIF managers and advisors are typically well compensated compared to both mutual funds that invest in publicly-traded securities and private venture capital funds that invest in private equity (with an average MER, again, in excess of 4%). We argue that the statutory generated dearth of competition among LSIFs likely accounts for the excessively high compensation to LSIF managers and advisors. In a cross-sectional analysis across the 50 LSIFs, we find higher fixed fees are associated with lower fund risk and lower fund returns. Higher carried interest fees tend to be associated with higher fund risk and returns, as well as greater capital accumulation. Hence, even in the unusual case of LSIFs investing in private companies, incentive fees do matter in mutual fund governance and performance, just as in the case of mutual funds that invest in public companies (see, e.g., Elton et al., 2001 ).
Finally, despite extremely low LSIF returns, we show that a significant amount of capital has being contributed to LSIFs. Despite earning rates of return lower than most bond indices, by the end of 2001 LSIFs had collectively accumulated CAN$8.4 billion (US$ 5.5 billion) of capital. Capital contributions have been sufficiently robust that, in the face of an inability to invest contributed capital within statutory constraints, Canada's two largest LSIF funds have both at one time or another suspended or limited capital contributions. Perhaps most surprising of all, we show that LSIF asset accumulation is negatively related to comparative rates of return among funds that have been in existence for more than 1 year, and unrelated to comparative rates of return among funds that have been in existence for more than 3 years (in contrast to evidence relating to mutual funds that invest in publicly traded firms; see e.g. Baks et al., 2001; Ellison, 1997, 1999a,b) . This surprising result casts grave doubt on the wisdom of the provincial and federal governments' LSIF programs While we focus on a unique institutional setting, we nonetheless believe that our results have general implications for the efficacy of focused government subsidization of venture capital. We note that venture capital organizations similar to Canadian LSIF have been introduced in other countries, such as the U.K.
2 In response to the perceived importance of venture capital to the funding of entrepreneurial firms, many governments have mounted programs that seek to foster venture capital financing. Such programs have been the subject of previous scholarly examination (Cressy, 2002; DeMeza, 2002; Lerner, 1999 Lerner, , 2002 Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2000, 2001; Keuschnigg, 2002; Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2001, 2002) . Prior work, however, has not considered the financial market properties of tax subsidized mutual funds that invest in private equity.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains in detail the LSIF corporate governance mechanisms. Tax incentives to invest in LSIFs are explicitly detailed in section 3. Sections 4 and 5 describe the LSIF data pertaining to risk, betas, returns, compensation, and fundraising. The determinants of LSIF betas, returns and asset accumulation are evaluated in section 6, 7, and 8, respectively. Section 9 discusses limitations and future research. Concluding remarks follow.
LSIF Mandate, Structure, and Governance
Elsewhere, we explore the identity of LSIF investors, in addition to LSIF mandates, structure, governance, and taxation (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2002) . In this section, we briefly summarize this and related research on both LSIF funds and private Canadian funds.
A LSIF fund may be incorporated in any province that has passed legislation specifically allowing for the creation of a LSIF. It may also be incorporated under similar federal legislation, in which case it may operate in any province that has passed legislation specifically authorizing federal LSIFs to operate in that jurisdiction. In either case, it must have a labour union sponsor, whose only participation in practice is to "rent" its name to the fund in return for a small portion of net assets, or a fixed annual fee. Only individuals may invest in LSIFs, 3 and minimum investment requirements are modest (typically less than or equal to 2 Venture Capital Trusts (VCTs) were introduced in the U. K. in 1995 K. in . Cumming (2003 notes UK VCTs are similar in structure to Canadian Labour Sponsored Investment Funds (Cumming's discussion paper is based on our paper).
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While precise data is not available, it would appear that, in Canada, corporations are the largest contributors to private $1000). Most LSIF contributions are made through the vehicle of a registered retirement savings plan ("RRSP", which roughly corresponds with a 401k plan in the United States). As further outlined below, all LSIF investments up to a certain amount (typically $5,000) receive generous federal and provincial tax credits, and contributions made through an RRSP receive additional tax benefits. In most provinces, LFIF investors are locked into their investments for eight years. Premature withdrawal results in repayment of the federal and provincial tax credits, and typically also results in the fund levying a withdrawal fee on the order of 6% of the investor's withdrawal amount.
LSIF legislation typically specifies multiple fund objectives, including regional development, enhancing financing for small firms, creating jobs, furthering worker education, and in some cases advancing the cause of unionised enterprise. Many of the LSIF funds, however, have stated that they principal or even sole objective is the pursuit of profits (although in Quebec, non-profit objectives are pursued with some vigour).
LSIFs legislation requires that LSIFs be formed as corporations, in contrast to the limited partnership form usually favoured by private funds. Mandatory use of the corporate form potentially gives rise to a number of adverse consequences. In particular, the use of corporate form sacrifices the discipline that the limited life span of a partnership imposes on management. The use of corporate form also diminishes contractual flexibility in constructing the nexus of contracts that underlies LSIF operation. While in theory use of the corporate form imposes a more exacting disciplinary structure on LSIF management than we observe in the case of private limited partnership (since shareholders directly elect the directors of the fund), the atomization of share ownership sacrifices most if not all of these benefits, since collective action and free rider problems ensure that few if any shareholders have the appropriate incentives to monitor or discipline fund manages. Moreover, LSIF legislation invariably requires that the sponsoring labour union receive a class of shares which, while not participating in dividends or assets on winding up, is entitled to appoint a majority of the directors. Few unions have shown any interest in exercising their powers of control, and many have contractually delegated their power to appoint directors to the management company that is contractually engaged to manage the fund. This results in a pure separation of ownership from fund control.
funds, followed by pension funds and individuals. The balance between these different types of investors varies substantially from one year to the next. This contrasts somewhat with the situation in the United States, in which pension funds are the largest contributors of capital, followed by corporations and individuals (Gompers and Lerner, 1998, 1999a; Smith and Smith, 2000) .
Further exacerbating the shareholders lack of control, many LSIFs contract with external parties for the supply of vital functions such as investment management. Because purely contractual duties are not as easily policed or enforced as duties performed internally under a command and control system, this contracting out has the effect of creating additional slack in the investor-manager relationship.
LSIFs are subject to a number of statutory constraints (see Osbourne and Sandler, 1998 , for particulars), including: (1) all LSIFs are constrained to invest in the sponsoring jurisdiction (as determined by the location of the investee firm's assets, employment, or other similar factors), (2) an 8-year investor lock-in period, (3) restrictions on the number of allowable funds in certain jurisdictions, (4) statutory penalties for failure to reinvest fixed percentages of contributed capital in private entrepreneurial firms within a stated period of time (typically 1 to 3 years, and (5) constraints on the size and nature of investment in any given entrepreneurial firm. These constraints can have the effect of forcing investments to be made in inferior firms and/or without adequate due diligence, limiting competition across LSIFs, and limiting investor discipline through threat of withdrawal of capital contributions.
These constraints are discussed in more detail below in conjunction with the analysis of the effect on betas, risk, returns and asset accumulation.
Many covenants suitably designed to mitigate opportunistic behavior among limited partnership venture funds (Gompers and Lerner, 1996 Lerner, , 1999a are absent among LSIFs, including restrictions on the use of debt, restrictions on co-investment by the organizations earlier or later funds, restrictions on coinvestment by VC managers (general partners), restrictions on fundraising by VC managers, and restrictions on other actions of VC managers, among other things.
In short, there is reason to believe, from a theoretical perspective, that LSIF funds are an inferior organizational form. The separation of ownership from control and the absence of other meaningful constraints on management, coupled with the presence of statutory limitations not present for either mutual funds or private venture capital funds, are highly suggestive that LSIF rates of return will lag those on both mutual funds and private venture capital funds.
The Tax Position of LSIF Investors
Many individuals contributing to LSIFs have no other investments (Vaillancourt, 1997) , and thus risk serious underdiversification. Given their inefficient structure, and the risks and illiquidity associated Investors are concerned about after-tax, rather than before-tax returns (Bergstresser and Poterba, 2000 , re mutual funds; see also Barclay et al., 1998 , re open-ended mutual funds and capital gains taxes).
The tax subsidies accorded LSIF investors thus result in LSIFs having a substantially lower required rate of return than either mutual funds or private venture capital funds (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003) .
The tax-expenditure cost of LSIFs to the various Canadian governments is extremely large. The tax-driven structure of the LSIFs tends to exacerbate the problem of overhang. In contrast to contributions to private funds, most contributions to LSIFs are made through RRSPs (see sections 2 and 3), with the consequence that the vast proportion of contributions are made in the final three months of the tax year (February-April). Moreover, unlike private funds, in order to secure the tax benefits associated with investing in an LSIF, investors must commit their funds up front, rather than making contractual commitments that are subsequently drawn as needed. This makes LSIF fundraising extremely "lumpy"
(again worsening the overhang problem). Table 1 presents summary statistics for the gross returns and the various other characteristics of each of the 50 LSIFs (note that no LSIF has ever been wound up, so that there is no issue of survivorship bias).
LSIF Characteristics and Performance: Univariate Data Analysis
The reported "beta" (which is calculated only for funds with 3 of more years of returns and reported by Globe Funds www.globefund.com) is not a real beta, in the sense that it does not reflect market-driven price 10 Canadian data sources for Figure 3 : www.globefund.com, www.morningstar.ca. The data do not exhibit survivorship bias because there has not been an LSIF that has been wound up (the tax benefits provided to these funds tend to ensure that capital inflows will occur regardless of performance). The US VC Index value from Peng (2001) volatility. Rather, it reflects the volatility of assessments of value made periodically (usually quarterly) by the board of directors, and at year's end by nominally independent valuers. We argue below that uncertainty in valuing private companies, the infrequency of LSIF reassessments of value, and perverse incentives of the fund and its valuer all conspire to make valuations "sticky", resulting in an artificial lowering of reported "betas". The betas are thus most useful in comparing the relative riskiness of different types of funds, rather than as absolute measures of systematic risk. We discuss this issue further in section 6 below.
In addition, unlike mutual funds or private venture capital funds, LSIFs have both managers and advisors. Unfortunately, there is no perfectly consistent definition of either manager or advisor, nor are reported managerial or advisory charges broken down between the various functions that a manager or advisor might perform. In order to be as consistent in our classification as possible, we designated an entity as the "manager" (no matter what the designation in the prospectus) if it handled investments or advised the board on investments (although a "manager" may also perform advisory services). The advisor category includes entities performing other administrative functions (such as cash administration and other back office functions, and in some cases marketing).
A number of stylised facts, many puzzling but addressed below in the subsequent sections, are observed from the univariate presentation and analysis of the data in Tables 1:   12 • LSIF betas average 0.378. This is unexpectedly low, given that LSIFs invest a significant part of their portfolios (60-80%, if statutory targets are met) in comparatively high risk private entrepreneurial companies (cf. Smith and Smith, 2000; Cochrane, 2001; Kerins et al., 2003; Astebro, 2003) .
• There is negative relationship between LSIF beta and fund return, in contrast to the standard positively sloped security market line.
• LSIFs with greater proportions of their portfolios invested in equity (as opposed to bonds or cash)
have not achieved superior returns, in contrast to the premium typically associated with equity (note that the bond and equity proportions used herein are the typical holdings by the fund over a 3-year horizon, as reported by www.globefund.com).
• LSIF performance has not improved with age. This runs counter to both theory and evidence suggesting that the greater the experience of private venture fund managers, the greater the return 12 A correlation matrix on file with the authors indicates similar univariate patterns as reported in Table 1. (e.g., Chan et al., 1990; Bergmann and Hege, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2001; Keuschnigg, 2002; Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2001, 2003a,b) .
• LSIF MERs are very high relative to other mutual funds. The sum of the fixed fees paid to managers and to advisors averages 3.45%, which is only slightly less than the average MER of 4.03% in 2001.
13 By contrast, the average MER for all Canadian mutual funds is 2.29% (and 1.50% in the US; see Ruckman, 2003) .
• Despite the fact that LSIF funds have had returns that grossly lag pertinent market indices (and mutual funds, whose returns roughly track the broad market index), and in the face of extremely The following sections explore the puzzling aspects of the LSIF data in a multivariate analysis of betas (section 6), returns (section 7), and asset accumulation (section 8). The ordering of the analysis of these interrelated issues in the following sections is based on causality running from risk to returns to fundraising (causal relations that are consistent with asset pricing theory and with prior literature on mutual funds, as discussed further below; endogeneity tests did not indicate the presence of potential bias).
LSIF Betas

Model Specification
To understand cross-sectional variation across different LSIF betas, it is important to understand that LSIF betas (which average 0.378; see Table 1 ) are artificially low, for three reasons. First, valuations are not made continuously, as in the public market, but only at periodic intervals (typically monthly and/or quarterly, and yearly). Interim (i.e., quarterly) valuations are typically made by the board of directors on the advice of a valuation sub-committee. Legislation requires that an independent valuer make year-end valuations.
Episodic reporting of values produces a downward bias in betas (Fowler et al., 1979) . Second, valuations of 13 This indicates that most of the fees earned by LSIF managers are paid in the form of fixed fees rather than carried interest.
private companies (and especially technology firms and firms in the early stages of development) are made in the face of extreme uncertainty, and are thus subject to large confidence internals. For this reason, unlike firms in the public markets, revaluations are typically made only in the face of large changes in the firm's circumstances (again biasing "beta" downwards). Third, LSIF managers have an incentive to smooth portfolio company valuations in order to reduce apparent risk, facilitating marketing efforts to retail investors.
The key importance of low risk in marketing efforts is suggested by even a casual scrutiny of LSIF web sites (which, in almost every case, base their marketing efforts on low risk and generous tax credits, rather than returns 14 ). LSIF web pages and mutual fund reporting services routinely fail to explain to investors that LSIF betas are artificially low.
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The risk aversion of LSIF managers provides a supporting incentive to smooth the valuation stream.
LSIF managers collect most of their remuneration in the form of fixed fees (Table 1) . They therefore have an incentive to limit the extent of revaluations in order to smooth reported net asset values, maintaining a steady collection of fixed fees, and ultimately the managers' personal income streams. While in theory the independent valuer acts as a brake on the extent to which management can 'fix' valuations to effect this end, the fund managers have virtually unfettered control over the identity of the fund's valuer. Because of LSIF organizational structure, managerial choices are virtually immune from challenge by investors, who lack the power of control. While control resides in the Labour fund sponsor, its compensation takes the form of either a fixed annual fee or a small percentage of net asset value (typically 0.25%). Where it collects a portion of net asset value, its incentive is clearly to maximize net asset value rather than profitability. Even in cases in which it collects a fixed fee, its only interest is to ensure the survival of the fund -which (particularly since the managers are fixed fee collectors) is better served by maximizing net asset value than by high returns.
While the natural assumption (for which there is empirical support in the case of mutual funds that invest in 14 See e.g. "Not Just a Pretty Tax Credit" at http://www.crocusfund.com/advisor/printconcept14.html. In its promotional material, the Crocus Fund indicates that in the period following September 11, 2001, its returns have fallen less than the public market. This is highly misleading in at least two respects. First, as indicated earlier, LSIF companies are valued not by the market, but by the fund (interim reporting periods) and an independent valuator (year end reporting period). Because of the inherent difficulty of valuing private companies and the skewed incentives of the board and the independent valuer, valuations tend to be "sticky" and subject to less fluctuation than public market prices, regardless of the underlying fundamentals.
Moreover, the web site fails to present information relating to returns for periods prior to September 11, 2001, during which the Crocus Fund significantly underperformed the market (see Table 1 (Manitoba)).
Despite intensive searches over a 2-year period, the authors still have yet to find a single source that explains why LSIF betas are artificially low. We may infer that a casual or unsophisticated investor is likely to infer that widely reported LSIF betas accurately represent fund risk. More generally, see e.g., Elton and Gruber (2000), and Elton et al. (2002) . public companies) is that fund profitability and the ability to attract capital contributions are closely related, our empirical analysis of asset accumulation (below) suggests a virtually complete disjunction between annual returns and fund raising for LSIFs. In short, the Labour union has little incentive to question management's selection of a valuer; in fact, it shares management's incentive to reduce apparent risk in the interest of attracting capital contributions. With virtually unchecked management power to appoint a valuer, the nominally independent valuer is thus closely dependent upon the goodwill of management, and likely to produce valuations that are congenial to management. For these reasons, we suggest that reported "pseudobetas" are more useful as an indicator of the comparative than the absolute systematic risk of LSIFs.
A further outgrowth of the periodic nature of LSIF valuations is that we cannot consider risk and returns in time series regressions based on daily price change; rather, we are limited to examining only crosssectional differences in risk and returns across the 50 LSIFs. In the regressions that follow, we present a variety of alternative cross-sectional specifications to illustrate robustness (other specifications, which are available on request, did not yield materially different results). Our cross-sectional regressions across the 50
LSIFs account for the following factors:
• The percentage of equity and bond holdings in entrepreneurial firms (we would expect higher equity holdings to be associated with more risk and higher betas; see, e.g., Smith and Smith, 2000; Cochrane, 2001; Kerins et al., 2003; Astebro, 2003) , 16 • LSIF age, and a dummy variable for organizations with more than 1 LSIF (we would expect these factors to proxy for fund experience, which could impact fund risk and betas), • Fixed fees and carried interest percentages (since both fixed fees and carried interest to may have an impact on managerial risk taking and fund beta), • Dummy variables for different jurisdictions allowing for the creation of a LSIF (a dummy for Ontario is excluded to avoid perfect collinearity), and • Dummy variables for funds that invest primarily in early stage entrepreneurial firms (a dummy for funds without a stage focus is suppressed), technology sector entrepreneurial firms across the spectrum of technology sectors, and specific sectors of technology firms (a dummy for funds without a sectoral focus is suppressed). 16 Equity, bond and cash holdings are based on the www.globefund.com reports of the typical equity holdings (etc.) by the fund. As indicated in Table 1 , this information is not reported for some funds. For the purpose of the regressions, for the funds where this information was not available, we used the average of the other LSIF equity (etc.) holdings for those funds. The regression estimates are quite robust to alternative specifications (available upon request). Table 2 provides regressions for the fund pseudo-betas (Models (1) - (4)) and return variance (Models (5) - (8)) as recorded in the GlobeFund databank (based on calculations for funds with at least 3 years of data). There is a surprisingly weak link between the percentage of equity in a fund's portfolio and both pseudo-beta and return variance. In only one of three models in Table 2 (Model (4)) in which equity holdings were included as an independent variable were we able to find a statistically significant link between equity holdings and pseudo-beta, and the coefficient is small (a 10% increase in equity holdings increases beta by 0.04). Moreover, in none of our regressions was there a statistically significant link between the percentage of bond holdings and pseudo-beta. The weakness of the link may be attributable to variations in valuation practice, which introduce noise into pseudo-beta calculations. If so, this casts serious doubt on the intercomparability of LSIF portfolio valuations. We did, however, find a statistical link between equity holdings and returns variance in two of three regressions (Models (7) and (8) indicate a 10% increase in equity holdings increases returns variance by approximately 1.4%). Older funds also have higher pseudo-betas (Models (2) and (3): an increase in age by 1 year is suggestive of an increase in beta by 0.003). There is also some evidence that older funds have greater returns variance (Model (7): an increase in age by 1 year increases returns variance by 0.06%), although statistical significance was achieved in only 1 of 3 models. Overall, the data suggest that more experienced LSIF managers undertake investments in riskier entrepreneurial firms, although our results are not robust to all specifications.
Regression Estimates
We would expect higher carried interest fees to be associated with higher fund risk, since managerial carried interest fees are, in essence, managerial call options, and heightened volatility increases the value of these options. We indeed find that a 10% increase in carried interest is associated with an increase in beta of 0.2, and an increase in returns variance by 8.7%. Conversely, we would expect that higher fixed fees will produce lower fund risk, since higher fixed fees will induce risk averse managers to reduce the volatility of fund returns in order to increase the present value of their personal income stream. We also find that this is the case; a 1% increase in fixed fees is associated with a reduction in beta by 0.2, and lowering of returns variance by 6.1%.
We would have expected generalist funds (which invest in both technology and non-technology sectors) to have the lowest betas, followed by general technology funds, and specific technology funds.
The more general the investment focus, the greater the degree of diversification and the lower the degree of asset specificity (which is generally associated with enhance risk). We would also have expected funds that invest in relatively risky early stage ventures to have comparatively high betas. However, the data are not consistent with these expectations. The general technology focus dummy in Table 2 is in fact positive and significant in respect of both betas and returns variance, with coefficients on the order of 0.3). However, the early stage and specific technology dummies are negative and significant (early stage betas are lower by 0.5; specific tech fund betas are lower by 0.3). We believe that the result in respect of early stage ventures is attributable to inherent difficulties in valuing early stage enterprises. While early stage ventures may have a product prototype in place, many such ventures will yet to have generated revenues, let alone profits. Because of this, the tendency of the fund's board of directors and its independent valuers is to avoid re-valuations (and to carry investments at historical cost), lowering apparent volatility.
LSIF Returns
Model Specification
Similar to our analysis of pseudo-betas, in this section we present cross-sectional regressions for the determinants of fund returns. The independent variables that we include are:
• The percentage of equity and bond holdings in entrepreneurial firms (we would expect a premium associated with higher equity holdings), • LSIF pseudo beta,
• Fund age, and a dummy variable for organizations that market more than 1 LSIF (we would expect both of these factors to proxy for fund experience, which can in turn affect returns),
Pseudo-betas are included in the regressions to proxy for fund risk. Recall that for reasons discussed above, this is not
• Fixed fees and carried interest percentages (we would expect lower fixed fees and higher carried interest to be associated with greater managerial incentives and higher returns), • Dummy variables for general technology funds that invest across the spectrum of technology sectors, funds that focus specifically on early stage firms (a dummy for funds without a stage focus is suppressed), and funds with a specific technology focus (a dummy for funds without a sector focus is suppressed).
• Dummy variables for the LSIF's fee structure, including dummies for no load funds and funds with back end loads 18 (since loads have empirically been shown to be associated with the degree of competition between funds, and the presence of market power will affect a fund's ability to earn economic rents: a dummy for front end fees is suppressed) • Dummy variables for initial minimum and subsequent minimum RRSP purchase levels (which also proxy for the degree of market power possessed by a fund) and, • Dummy variables for various jurisdictions (a dummy for Ontario is excluded to avoid perfect collinearity; the rationale for these variables is also discussed immediately below). One view is that funds in non-competitive environments will earn a lower rate of return than other an actual beta. Diagnostic tests did not indicate problems associated with endogeneity. Note, however, that we do not include assets under administration, as this is (potentially) endogenous to returns. See section 7 below.
18
Loads charges (fees charged to investors for the privilege of investing) are either charged on the date of the investment -a "front-end load" -or upon exiting the investment -a "back end load".
LSIFs, because the managers of such funds face less pressure than those of other funds to manage their assets effectively. However, in competitive jurisdictions, there is likely to be a great deal more competition for deals with entrepreneurial firms, putting upward pressure on deal prices and reducing returns (cf. Gompers and Lerner, 2000) . It is thus not entirely clear what effect the presence or absence of competition (as proxied by load charges and minimum purchase levels: see section 2) will have on a fund's return. Nonetheless, it is plausible -indeed probable -that the degree of competitiveness of the environment in which a fund operates will affect fund returns. Table 3 provides cross-sectional regressions for the determinants of returns across LSIFs for the 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 3-year and 5-year periods. The results are robust for a variety of other specifications not presented but available upon request.
Regression Estimates
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
One of the more puzzling results in Table 3 is the consistently negative (and significant) relationship between fund returns and beta. This does not appear to be an artifact of the technology "bubble" of 1999-2002, since it is consistent across all time horizons, including the five-year horizon.
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Thus, for example, funds with betas that were 0.5 higher than the average had annualized returns that were approximately 0.05% to 0.1% lower than the average (the greatest coefficients are for the 1 year horizon ending June 2002).
Moreover, in the shorter performance periods (up to six months), funds with a greater proportion of equity in their portfolios experienced statistically lower returns (a 10% increase in equity holdings is associated with a 0.01% lowering in annualized returns), although in longer performance periods (one to five years) there was no statistically significant relationship between equity holdings and returns. It may be that the poorer performance over the shorter horizons reflects the economic downturn of 2001-2002. Similarly, for bond holdings and for horizons up to 3 months, a 10% increase in bond holdings is 19 For funds with less than 3-years of data for the returns regressions in models (1) -(4) in Table 4 (for horizons of less than 3 years) beta was specified as beta the average LSIF beta of 0.378 (see Table 1 ). Various alternative specifications did not materially affect the estimates. As well, note that the estimates for the 3-and 5-year horizons are quite similar, and for those regressions no assumptions had to be made as betas were available for all funds in those regressions. associated with greater annualized returns by 0.01%. However, over longer measurement intervals, the percentage of bond holdings was not statistically related to returns. Overall, these results suggest that LSIF management is at best value-neutral (if not value-destructive) with respect to its equity investing activities.
Over investment horizons up to and including one year, older LSIFs experienced lower returns than younger funds (over the one year period, returns were lowered by 0.0006%). In the three and five year performance periods, older funds did not experience either higher or lower returns. That LSIF returns for older funds are either lower or at best no higher than other funds refutes one of the most common defenses of the LSIF programs among practitioners and policy makers. A common refrain begins with the observation that in venture capital investing, "the lemons ripen quickly, while the plums ripen slowly" (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 1999a) . The apology concludes with the assertion that the LSIF programs are still too young for the plums to have been brought to fruition. However, the data do not indicate superior performance among the older funds.
With respect to fixed fees, we would expect that funds that charge higher fixed fees will have a greater incentive to purchase conservative investments in order to generate a reasonably constant stream of fixed fees and reduce the variance of managers' remuneration. This will reduce returns. Over longer time horizons (one, three and five year returns) there appears to be no systematic relationship between fixed fees and returns. Over shorter horizons up to 1 year, higher manager fixed fees appear to be associated with lower returns. Curiously, however, higher advisor fixed fees are associated with higher returns (although these results are sensitive to the econometric specification).
The function of carried interest is to align manager interests with those of shareholders, and to motivate managers to produce profits (Gompers and Lerner, 1999b; Elton et al., 2001) . On this basis, higher carried interest payments should be associated with higher returns. There is evidence that this is the case over the three and five year time horizons in Table 3 (Models (9), (11) and (12) (a 10% increase in carried interest is associated with greater annualized returns of approximately 0.03%). Over the time horizons of up to one year (Models (1) -(8) in Table 4 ), there is a negative relation between carried interest and returns. Because the one year horizon spans the 2001-2002 downturn in the economy, the lower returns among funds with higher carried interest charges suggests that funds with higher carried interest have invested in riskier entrepreneurial firms.
We would generally expect risk to increase for funds that focus either on a relatively narrow part of the industrial spectrum (i.e. general technology and specific technology funds) or on early stage firms.
Consequently, standard asset pricing theory suggests that these funds will exhibit higher returns. The evidence is supportive for general technology and specific technology funds, but not for early stage funds.
Funds with back end fees and no loads had statistically superior returns, but only over short performance horizons (one, three and six months). There is no evidence that LSIFs with higher minimum initial and subsequent RRSP purchase levels produced higher returns. In contrast, James and Karceski (2001), show (for mutual funds that invest in public companies) that higher minimum investment requirements are associated with enhanced performance.
In sum, a few puzzling findings stand out from the regression on the cross-sectional determinants of LSIF returns. First, there is the systematically negative relationship between pseudo-betas and fund returns over all horizons. Second, older funds do not produce higher returns. This evidence runs contrary to U.S. evidence suggesting that older private venture capital funds have experienced higher returns. It also belies one of the most persistent defenses of the LSIF programs -that insufficient time has elapsed to conduct a meaningful review of LSIF profitability.
These two findings (along with in Figure 3 showing underperformance) are suggestive of low managerial skill. Alternatively, they evidence the effect of the statutory constraints noted earlier on managerial behavior.
LSIF Asset Accumulation
Model Specification
Similar to the prior specifications, in this section we present cross-section regressions for the determinants of assets under administration. The variables considered include:
• LSIF age, and a dummy for organizations with more than 1 LSIF (we expect these factors to be associated with greater accumulation of assets, due, respectively, to greater time to accumulate assets and heightened investor recognition), • Dummy variables for back end fees and no load fees (a dummy for front end fees is suppressed), and for the minimum RRSP and subsequent RRSP purchase levels (since fee structures could naturally be expected to affect investor incentives to invest), • Fixed fees and carried interest percentages (we would expect lower fixed fees and higher carried interest to be associated with a greater alignment of investor and manager incentives, resulting in greater accumulation of assets under administration), • Dummy variables for LSIFs that focus on early stage entrepreneurial firms (a dummy for funds without a stage focus is suppressed), general technology sector entrepreneurial firms, and specific technology entrepreneurial firms (a dummy for funds without a sector focus is suppressed) (we include these variables to account for sectoral investment preferences among investors), • Dummy variables for the various jurisdictions sponsoring LSIF funds (a dummy for Ontario is excluded to avoid perfect collinearity), and • LSIF returns since fund inception (other horizons are not considered simultaneously to avoid collinearity). There is strong evidence that, in general, fund performance is a strong determinant of assets under administration (in the mutual fund literature, see, e.g., Baks et al., 2001; Ellison, 1997, 1999a,b;  in the venture capital literature, see Gompers and Lerner, 1998). Table 4 presents regressions on the cross-sectional determinants of LSIF assets under administration for funds that have been in existence for at least 1 year, 3 years and 5 years. 20 Perhaps the most interesting result in Table 4 is that for LSIFs the quantum of assets under administration is unrelated to fund rates of return for the funds that have been in existence for more than 3-and 5-years, and negatively related to fund rates of return for the funds that have been in existence for more than 1 year.
Regression Estimates
These results are robust to a variety of other specifications of the explanatory variables not presented (e.g., returns over different horizons, etc., which are not reported together due to collinearity issues), and other specifications of the dependent variable not presented for reason of succinctness. 21 The lack of a 20 Note that Quebec's Solidarity fund, the oldest LSIF, is an outlier with $4.5 billion in assets. As such, we also considered regressions without the Solidarity fund; for those regressions, the coefficients were identical (but the model diagnostics are affected). Likewise, none of the estimates in the regressions in Tables 2 -4 were affected by the presence of Quebec's Solidarity fund (and/or any other particular fund); additional specifications are available upon request. relationship (and negative relationship for the specification including the nascent funds) between returns and asset growth is very potent evidence of the importance of tax incentives in inducing investment into LSIFs. As well, the evidence is suggestive of a lack of sophistication of LSIF investors; even tax-favored investors should not be indifferent to comparative rates of return when deciding where to invest.
The lack of a relationship between fund returns and asset accumulation may also be a product of statutory constraints placed both on investors that limit investor choice. As noted earlier (see sections 2 and 3), for provincially incorporated funds, provincial tax credits are available only to residents of the province in which the fund is incorporated. Moreover, once a LSIF investment is made, LSIF investors are locked into their investments for a period of 8 years. Early withdrawal results not only in a penalty fee levied by the fund (which is typically 6% of the individual's stake), but in the retroactive loss of all tax credits (see note 4 and accompanying text). This severely constraints investor mobility once an investment is made, and hence the ability to switch from a less profitable to a more profitable fund. The regulatory structure therefore effectively drives a wedge between returns and asset accumulation across different LSIFs. We also note that LSIFs typically market their product not on the basis of a complete picture of fund returns (see notes 13 and 14), but on the generous tax benefits available, artificially generated claims of low risk, and selectively presented returns data. We believe that this also accounts, in part, for the lack of a relation between returns and asset accumulation.
[ TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] Table 4 contains further evidence that tax incentives drive asset accumulation. If tax savings are the primary determinant of LSIF investing, then fund age should be a predominant statistically significant predictor of asset growth. Table 4 suggests that this is the case; fund age is associated with asset growth over all three performance horizons (one, three and five years). Moreover, the economic importance of the age variable increases in the regressions for the older funds: for the larger sample including funds of more than 1, 3, and 5 years in age, each extra year is associated with approximately an extra $2 million, $3 million, and $4.5 million in assets, respectively. We also note that greater asset accumulation took place over a five-year horizon if the fund was part of a fund group (more than 1 LSIF per fund, which is associated with approximately $146 million extra in assets). This result reinforces the view that economies of scale exist in fund marketing and in achieving enhanced investor recognition (see, e.g., Dermine and Roller, 1992) .
Finally, we note that fee structures are significant determinants of capital accumulation. Funds with higher managerial carried interest have attracted more capital (the economic significance of the effect varies across the specifications, but generally a 10% higher carried interest percentage is associated with $50 -$70 million more in assets). Overall, this evidence suggests that investors believe that higher carried interest charges will yield higher returns. This expectation is in line with extant theory and evidence concerning private venture capital funds, and suggests that LSIF investors are not completely unsophisticated. This rational behavior among LSIF investors suggests that statutory constraints inhibiting competition between funds have accounted for the lack of a relationship between fund returns and asset accumulation. A lack of competition between funds is also consistent with our observation that LSIF management fees are generally well in excess of those charged either by mutual funds that invest in public companies, or by private venture funds.
Limitations and Future Research
Our cross-sectional regression analyses are primarily limited by the degrees of freedom available in our data, in that there are only 50 LSIFs, and many have not been in existence for very long. As Nonetheless, it will obviously be instructive to re-evaluate LSIF performance at points in the future.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
Labour Sponsored Investment Funds (LSIFs) were created with the intention of promoting investment in small and medium-sized entrepreneurial firms, with an emphasis on the technology sectors.
The mechanism for promoting such investment was to create what is essentially a hybrid between a mutual fund (capitalized by retail investors and investing mainly in public companies), and a venture capital fund (capitalized by institutional investors, corporations and high net worth individuals, and investing primarily in private entrepreneurial companies). Only retail investors may invest in a LSIF, and minimum contributions are low, facilitating the capture of investments from low net worth individuals.
Investors are generously subsidized via tax credits and, when the investment is made through an RRSP retirement vehicle, deductibility from income. Aggregate tax expenditures on LSIF tax credits (but not deductibility) for 1992-2002 were roughly $3.27 billion, amounting to 33.4% of all contributions made to LSIFs during this period of time.
An examination of LSIFs serves as an object lesson in the effects of organizational design on firm performance. The governance structure of LSIFs is established not by the market, but by statute. This statutory structure sacrifices many of the organizational advantages of the private venture capital limited partnership. It also drives a wedge between ownership and control, creating sub-optimal managerial incentives. It also imposes statutory constraints on the investment activities of LSIFs that are not shared either by mutual funds or by private venture capital funds, and directs LSIFs to pursue goals other than profit maximization (which, however, appear to be observed only by a small minority of funds). Further statutory constraints limit investor choice at the time when the initial investment is made by conferring tax credits only on investors who are resident in the province of incorporation. Moreover, the eight year mandatory hold period, coupled with the recapture of tax credits for premature withdrawal, make it impossible as a practical matter for investors to shift their capital between competing funds once the investment has been made. These statutory constraints severely limit the extent of competition between LSIF funds, allowing them to charge management fees that are well in excess of those charged by either mutual funds or private venture capital funds. These high fees, coupled with the inferior returns of LSIF shareholders suggest that LSIF managers are the primary, if not the exclusive beneficiaries of the government tax subsidies.
The gross return of the LSIF index over the 1992 -1999 period was 28%, compared to 160% for the TSE 300 Index, 180% for the Globe Canadian Small Cap Peer Index, and 650% for the US Venture Capital Index (as computed by Peng, 2001 ). While LSIF betas are extremely low (averaging 0.378), consistent with returns that lag a broad market index, we suggest that there are a number of reason why these "pseudo-betas" cannot be taken as a true measure of LSIF risk. These include the fact that valuations are not conducted in an open market, are made infrequently, and are distorted by managerial (and valuer) incentives to understate portfolio risk.
The evidence presented in this paper is at odds with LSIF managerial learning, whereby managers at older funds develop their skills and generate superior returns. In our data, despite having higher pseudo-betas, older funds produced lower returns. This counters a common defence of LSIFs, which is that insufficient time has passed to evaluate the performance of LSIFs, many of which are recent entrants to the field and have thus not had time to generate returns over a full investment cycle. The inability of more experienced managers to generate superior returns may also be reflective of the vast capital inflows into LSIF funds (generated by the generous tax incentives), coupled with statutory constraints that not only limit the geographical scope (and type) of investments that may be considered, but force managers to invest contributed capital within mandated time periods ranging from one to three years of receipt.
Surprisingly, we found strong evidence that fund pseudo-betas are inversely related to returns (unlike the standard positively sloped security market line), over all horizons up to 5-years. Allied with evidence suggesting that funds that invest more in entrepreneurial equity do not generate higher returns, this suggests that LSIF managers are do not exhibit a high degree of skill in selecting entrepreneurial investees.
This calls into question the primary motivation behind the creation of the LSIF programs, which has been to foster equity investment in fledgling entrepreneurial enterprises.
Despite their low returns compared to other asset classes, and MERs averaging over 4% (and as high as 8%), LSIFs have attracted aggregate capital inflows on the order of $8 billion in 10 years.
Perhaps the most surprising empirical result in our study is that there is no statistically verifiable relationship between particular LSIF returns and asset accumulation for LSIFs that have been in existence for more than 3 years, contrary to widespread evidence relating to mutual funds that invest in public companies. In fact, including all funds that have been in existence for only 1 year, there is a negative relationship between fund returns and LSIF asset accumulation. This may be contrasted to evidence suggesting that asset accumulation by mutual funds that invest in public companies is closely tethered to fund performance. We feel confident in suggesting that, but for their tax generated returns, LSIFs would not exist.
It has been strenuously argued that the Canadian LSIF model should be adopted in the US in order to further stimulate investment in entrepreneurial companies (see, e.g., Hebb, 1999) . Similarly, the policymakers are considering expanding tax concessions to U.K. Venture Capital Trusts, which have a very similar structure to Canadian LSIFs (Cumming, 2003) . The Canadian experience with LSIFs indicates that similar structures should not be adopted or fostered in other countries. M a r -9 3 D e c -9 3 S e p -9 4 J u n -9 5 M a r -9 6 D e c -9 6 S e p -9 7 J u n -9 8 M a r -9 9 D e c -9 9 S e p -0 0 J u n -0 1 M a r -0 2
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"---" means that returns are not systematically publicly reported, or the fund was recently introduced so the data are not available for the period. 1. Betas are actually "pseudo betas" as LSIF share prices are based on periodic (typically quarterly) valuations, where they have been in existence for at least 3 years. The pseudo-betas are reported on www.globefund.com. There does not exist a market price per se for the funds (independent of the quarterly valuations), and so actual betas and alphas do not exist.
Data sources: www.globefund.com, www.morningstar.ca. the percentage of equity and bond holdings held by the fund (a variable for cash holdings is suppressed), the age of the fund (in months), a dummy for funds in firms with more than 1 fund, managerial fixed fee and carried interest %, dummies for jurisdiction of incorporation (an Ontario dummy is suppressed), dummies for early stage focus, general tech focus, and specific tech focus, dummies fo back end and no load sales fee structure, and variables for the level of minimum Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) and subsequent RRSP purchase levels to obtain tax breaks in the RRSP. HCCME estimated covariance matrix. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1%% levels, respectively.
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